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ABSTRACT
Over time, it has become easier for consumers to steal music. Some technologies, like ReDigi, have
been specifically designed to allow copyright infringement by giving consumers the ability to sell
digitally purchased music files. While copyright laws have been updated to deal with changing
technologies, the laws have not been sufficient to keep up. This comment highlights the failings of
modern copyright law and questions whether patent laws are a viable way to ensure that
technologies that induce copyright infringement do not find marketplace success.
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INVENTING A NEW WAY OF DEALING WITH CIRCUMVENTION: A
PATENT-BASED ALTERNATIVE TO THE DMCA
PRIYA DESAI*
I. INTRODUCTION
Some technologies are designed to violate copyright laws, but Congress allows
them patent protection despite being harmful to the public. Internet services, like
“the Cloud,” have heightened the rise of copyright-infringing technologies. “The
Cloud” is a household term to consumers who buy digital goods, like MP3s or e-books,
then use goods on their several devices. Some consumers insist on using CDs and
physical books, while others convert to digital libraries of songs, books, and movies. 1
The distinction between “ownership” and “access” over a digital good often confuses
consumers.2 Those who do recognize the difference are engaged in a debate about
whether licensing is preferable to ownership. 3
Software that is used to manage and purchase digital content, like iTunes, may
further confuse consumers who click “Purchase” in the iTunes Store, because they
are actually receiving a license.4 In 2012, consumers challenged Apple’s power to
control digital content in their music libraries. 5 In 2006, Apple implemented
software updates that prevented music players from playing music that wasn’t
* © Priya Desai 2015. Juris Doctor Candidate, The John Marshall Law School, 2016; Bachelor
of Science in Chemical Engineering, Iowa State University, 2009. I would like to thank my
wonderful family for their patience, encouragement, and continued support. I would also like to
thank The John Marshall Law School for providing many opportunities, including the opportunity to
write for The Review of Intellectual Property Law. Finally, thank you to Professors Maureen
Collins, Daryl Lim, the late Benjamin Liu, and Mr. Richard Beem for teaching me about intellectual
property.
1 Thorin Klosowski, Where Digital Fails: The Pitfalls of Ditching Your Physical Media,
LIFEHACKER (Dec. 26, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://lifehacker.com/where-digital-fails-the-pitfalls-ofditching-your-phys-1489218620.
2 Id.
3 International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions, Workshop: What Exactly
am I Buying? Ownership vs. Licensing in Digital Age at the WSIS +10 Review Meeting at UNESCO
Paris (Feb. 26, 2013).
4 iTunes Licensed Application End User License Agreement, APPLE (Dec. 20, 2014),
https://www.apple.com/legal/internet-services/itunes/appstore/dev/stdeula/
[hereinafter
“EULA”](“The Products transacted through the Service are licensed, not sold, to You for use only
under the terms of this license.”) See also University of Texas Libraries, Copyright in the Library,
THE COPYRIGHT CRASH COURSE (2007), http://copyright.lib.utexas.edu/l-intro.html (“Digital works
are licensed and the license provides permission to distribute such works . . . many licenses will:
permit limited access (ie, only registered students, faculty and staff); not allow the library to keep a
copy of the works when the license is terminated or expires.”).
5 Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litig., No. C-05-00037-JW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134836 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 22, 2011). See generally Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litigation, Class-Action Lawsuit,
IPOD LAWSUIT (Aug. 6, 2012), https://ipodlawsuit.com/Home.asp.
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purchased through iTunes. 6 The court found for Apple, who argued that software
secured music authenticity,7 and didn’t hinder music vendors.8 Apple effectively
implemented limitations on how consumers can use purchased works. 9
Then, Bopaboo started a trend of copyright-infringing, and copyrightcircumventing technologies.
Bopaboo came along as a “digital secondary
marketplace” to facilitate buying and selling “used” MP3s in 2008. 10 Bopaboo was
among the first to offer a digital garage sale, where a seller can discard, and a buyer
can obtain, used goods. Bopaboo raised issues of copyright infringement, but quickly
fizzled.11 ReDigi entered the digital garage sale market, claiming to be a “legal
alternative to piracy and file sharing,”12 allowing consumers to “unlock… digital
wealth” by buying and selling digital works. 13 To use ReDigi, a seller identifies a file.

Shara Tibken, Apple’s iPod antitrust class action suit: All you need to know (FAQ), CNET (Dec.
1, 2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/apples-ipod-antitrust-class-action-suit-all-you-need-toknow-faq/.
7 Brian Chen, Apple Wins Decade-Old Suit Over iTunes Updates, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 16,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/17/technology/apple-antitrust-suit-ipod-music.html (“Apple
applauded the verdict in a statement. ‘We created iPod and iTunes to give our customers the world’s
best way to listen to music . . . . Every time we’ve updated those products — and every Apple
product over the years — we’ve done it to make the user experience even better.’”).
8 Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Somers v. Apple, Inc., No. C 07-6507 JW
(N.D. Cal., July 9, 2010) (“Apple used its dominant market position . . . to stifle competition and
strengthen its monopoly in these markets” and “engaged in systematic conduct to shut out rivals’
competing audio downloads and portable digital media player by cutting off their access to the
marketplace.”).
9 Ben Sisario, Judge Rules Against Grooveshark in Copyright Infringement Case, New York
Times (Sept. 29, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1nCdUYs (music service company Grooveshark held liable for
copyright infringement when employees uploaded personal music purchases to the Grooveshark
website for consumer use at no cost to the company). See generally BILL ROSENBLATT, ET AL.,
DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY (John Wiley & Sons, 2001), preface
available at http://www.giantstepsmts.com/drm_bookpreface.htm (discussing how digital intellectual
property may be managed by digital rights management (DRM) because “need for control and
management software which restricts how a user uses digital content . . . is becoming more utilized
because “digital content can be copied with perfect fidelity”).
10 Duncan Geere, Bopaboo - selling second-hand MP3s. This has got to be a joke, right?, TECH
DIGEST (Dec. 4, 2008), http://www.techdigest.tv/2008/12/bopaboo_selling.html (explaining how a
consumer uses Bopaboo: “upload songs, and then others can download them at a price, at which
point you get some cash, and the site takes 20% . . . . On the upload page, they say ‘Remember, once
you sell a song, it is your responsability [sic] to delete all copies from your possession.’”).
11 Greg Sandoval, Reselling MP3s: The music industry’s new battleground?, CNET (Dec. 15,
2008 12:46 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/reselling-mp3s-the-music-industrys-new-battleground/
(quoting Fred von Lohmann, senior staff attorney for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, that “there
is no doubt that the first-sale law was drafted with physical objects in mind . . . when it comes to
selling MP3s, it’s an untested legal question.”).
12 The New ReDigi, http://www.redigi.com//site/index-invite.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2014).
13 U.S. Patent No. 12,983,257 (issued on Jan. 7, 2014) (ReDigi’s patent covers a “method and
apparatus for sharing, transferring and removing previously owned digital media”).
6
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Then, through a “Verification Engine,” ReDigi verifies that the file is “legally owned”
and was “lawfully purchased.”14 If so, the file is transferred to a cloud by “atomic
transfer,” which “migrates a user’s file, packet by packet.” 15 Once uploaded, a
desktop client sweeps and removes duplicates from the computer. 16 The seller then
marks the file for sale, and it is placed in the “marketplace” at a discounted price.17
In 2013, a district court found ReDigi liable for infringing the copyrights of Capitol
Records. This decision preceded the Patent Office’s issuance of ReDigi’s patent for
“atomic transactions.”18 ReDigi’s corporate officers, as ReDigi’s creative minds and
controllers, may also be liable for infringement.19 Now, Amazon20 and Apple21 are
joining the competition to create a successful “digital market.”

Jessica Leber, A Startup Asks: Why Can’t You Resell Old Digital Songs?, MIT TECH. REV.
(Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/428792/a-startup-asks-why-cant-you-resellold-digital-songs.
15 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., No. 12-95, 2013 WL 1286134, at 1* (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30,
2013). The court seemed unconvinced that no copying occurred even with ReDigi’s analogies of its
technology to the Star Trek transporter and “Willy Wonka’s teleportation device, Wonkavision.”
“ReDigi stresses that it ‘migrates’ a file . . . no copying occurs. However . . . the fact that a file has
moved from one material object – the user’s computer – to the ReDigi server – means that a
reproduction has occurred.”
16
Is
ReDigi
Legal?
Yes!,
ReDigi,
http://www.studiolegaleclipeo.it/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/DOCUMENTO_Is-ReDigi-Legal-Yes.pdf (last visited December 4, 2014).
See supra note 10 for a discussion on how Bopaboo also implemented the “upload and delete”
concept.
17
Jennifer Alsever, ReDigi: Sell Your Unwanted MP3s, INC (May 29, 2012),
http://www.inc.com/magazine/201206/jennifer-alsever/redigi-john-ossenmacher.html (explaining that
ReDigi users can buy songs for 79 cents each or they can use credits received from previous sales on
the website).
Compare iTunes Store: iTunes Plus FAQ, APPLE (Nov. 8, 2014),
http://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201616 (stating that iTunes songs are available for 69 cents, 99
cents, or $1.29).
18 Matt Peckham, ReDigi CEO Says the Court Just Snatched Away Your Right to Resell What
You Legally Own, TIME INTERVIEWS (April 15, 2013), http://techland.time.com/2013/04/25/redigi-ceosays-the-court-just-snatched-away-your-right-to-resell-what-you-legally-own/ (explaining that
ReDigi sees its newly patented technology does not violate reproduction rights because it “pick[s] up
those bits that are moving around on your drive and . . . move them, literally, a portion at a time, so
that what’s in the cloud is never at the same time on your device). See generally Memorandum of
Law in Further Support of ReDigi’s Summary Judgment Motion at 7-9, Capitol Records, LLC v.
ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 90).
19 Chris Cooke, ReDigi founders will remain as defendants on Capitol’s infringement litigation,
Complete
Music
Update
(Sep.
4,
2014,
11:54AM),
http://www.completemusicupdate.com/article/redigi-founders-will-remain-as-defendants-on-capitolsinfringement-litigation/ (“The record company argued that the two men came up with the idea of
ReDigi, and totally controlled the business, and therefore should be personally liable for any
copyright infringement.”).
20 U.S. Patent No. 8,364,595 (issued on Jan. 29, 2013) (covering Amazon’s claims for an
“electronic marketplace for used digital objects” which employs a “copy and delete” mechanism by
which the user “move[s] the used digital content to another user's personalized data store when
14
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This comment analyzes ReDigi’s intersection with patent and copyright policies.
Part II provides background on copyright and patent laws and key Supreme Court
cases, including Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,22 MGM Studios v.
Grokster,23 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank,24 Ultramercial v. Hulu,25 and buySAFE v.
Google.26 Part III analyzes ReDigi’s copyright infringement in the absence of First
Sale protection, whether ReDigi’s patent remains valid in light of recent Supreme
Court decisions, and how patent law incorporates morality into eligibility. In Part
IV, this comment proposes a standard for refusing and challenging patents on
technologies designed to infringe copyrights. In Part V, this comment proposes a way
for copyright holders to protect their rights in light of changing technology.
II. BACKGROUND
The Constitution authorizes Congress to create intellectual property law “to
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries.”27 This law is designed to “secure ‘the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors.’” 28 Further, “the grant of a copyright monopoly” is
justified by the public benefit of the works created. 29

permissible and the used digital content is deleted from the originating user's personalized data
store.” The legality of this technology has already been questioned). See generally Chris Cooke,
ReDigi responds to Amazon patent that indicates digital resale plans, Complete Music Update (Feb.
8, 2013, 12:43PM) (commenting on the “copy and delete” mechanism, “ReDigi takes no position on
the legality of this technique under copyright law but simply notes . . . publishing industries’
skepticism and opposition to a ‘used’ digital marketplace, and that the ReDigi Marketplace does not
use this technique.”).
21 U.S. Patent Pub. No. 20130060616 (filed on June 22, 2013) (covering Apple’s claim for a
method of “managing access to digital content items” that prevents a seller from accessing content
after the content is sold to a third party). See generally John T. Soma & Michael K. Kugler, Why
Rent When You Can Own? How ReDigi, Apple, and Amazon Will Use the Cloud and the Digital First
Sale Doctrine to Resell Music, E-Books, Games, and Movies, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 425, 449 (2014).
22 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
23 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
24 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
25 Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
26 buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
28 1-1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03 (2001) (citing New
York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 519 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
29 1-1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03 (2001).
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A. Copyright Policy and Framework
The current copyright law, codified in The Copyright Revision Act of 1976,
provides protection of “original works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible
medium,” like books, musical works, and television shows. 30 The creator of a work is
entitled to exclusive rights over that work, such as the right to reproduce or
distribute works,31 and is entitled to transfer her “exclusive rights” to third parties. 32
Infringement results when a party violates a holder’s exclusive rights without
authority or “fair use.”33
B. Copyright’s Rule of Exhaustion
A work of authorship is different from a copy of a work, and a copyright holder’s
rights are limited to the work itself, not the copy. 34 Copyright holders generally may
control the destiny of works via their exclusive rights. However, holders cannot

17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (extending limited copyright protection to “original works of
authorship, fixed in a tangible medium” created after 1972) [hereinafter “The Act”]. See Defendant
Pandora’s Answer to the Complaint at *24. Capitol Records, LLC v. Pandora Media, Inc., No.
651195/2014 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 2014) (claiming state copyright protection of public performances of pre1972 sound recordings). See also Flo & Eddie Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
139053(C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014) (claiming state copyright law for the payment of royalties on pre1972s songs).
31 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (providing exclusive rights to a copyright holder to (1) “reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords”; (2) “prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work”; (3) “distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work . . . transfer of
ownership”; (4) “perform the copyrighted work publicly”; (5) “display the copyrighted work publicly”;
and (6) “perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of digital audio transmission”). See
generally Washingtonian Publ’g. Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939) (stating that exclusive rights
give copyright owners the incentive to create works to “promote the progress of science” and benefit
society as a whole.)
32 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (granting copyright holders the possibility of transferring “exclusive
rights” to another party, with the right to later rescind the transfer).
33 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (providing for direct infringement when there is a violation of a
holders’ exclusive rights). See generally Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
42341 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2009) (demonstrating that secondary liability exists by contributory
liability when a party intentionally induces or encourages direct infringement, or by vicarious
liability when a party profits from direct infringement when declining to exercise a right to stop or
limit it).
34 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2012) (stating that ownership of a copyright does not mean ownership of a
material object in which the copyrighted work is embodied). This distinction is exemplified as the
difference between painting a painting (copyright holder) and owning a print of the painting
(owner). An owner can give away the tangible print.
30
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control how copies are used once copies are lawfully sold to purchasers. 35 This
principle is codified as the “First Sale Doctrine,” or the rule of exhaustion. 36 The
First Sale Doctrine balances competing personal and societal interests: copyright
owner’s interest, purchaser’s interest, the interest in promoting creation, and the
interest in promoting free commerce by avoiding restraints on alienation. 37 So far,
the Doctrine has only been applied to physical copies. 38
Alleged infringers argue for the First Sale Doctrine to be applied to digital
works, and look to support from policy considerations. The First Sale Doctrine is
designed to: promote access to works through secondary markets, preserve works
from becoming permanently lost, promote market efficiency by reducing the need to
communicate with the copyright holder, and promote innovation among copyright
owners, inventors and buyers.39
Because the First Sale Doctrine encourages the strength of secondary markets
and the availability of used copies, copyright owners often have to compete with
themselves. Owners can do so by creating new or derivative works to compete with
used copies in the secondary market. 40 The First Sale Doctrine also promotes
creation among consumers, because consumers are entitled to modify and transform
purchased works without consulting the original creator. 41 Some suggest that the

17 U.S.C. § 109 (2012) (stating that the owner of a particular copy is entitled to “sell or
otherwise dispose” of the possession of that copy). See supra note 34. The purchaser of the tangible
print can sell or dispose of the print without consulting the copyright holder.
36 Id. See also Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1391 (2013) (clarifying
that the First Sale Doctrine is known as the rule of exhaustion because the copyright holder’s
exclusive right to control a copy is “exhausted” after the first sale of the copy).
37 Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 20,
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). See also 1 E. Coke, Institutes of the
Laws
of
England
§
360,
p.
223
(1628),
available
at
http://www.constitution.org/18th/coke1st1778/coke1st1778_501-550.pdf (stating there is a harm to
“trade and traffique, and bargaining and contracting” that could accompany transfers of ownership
interests encumbered by alienation constraints).
38 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1352 (2013) (Ginsburg, R.B. dissenting)
(contemplating whether foreign editions of textbooks sold in the United States constitute copies that
were “lawfully made” pursuant to the “first sale” doctrine of 17 U.S.C. § 109(a)). Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent delineated the distinction between copyright protection, which extends to “intangible work of
authorship,” and “first sale” protection from Section 109 which is limited to “tangible, physical
embodiment of the work, the ‘copy.’” See generally 4 W. Patry, Copyright § 13:44.10, pp. 13-128
(2012).
39 See generally Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889
(2011). See also Written Statement of Stephen M. Smith President and Chief Executive Officer
Wiley: Hearing on First Sale Under Title 17, Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the
Internet
Comm.
on
the
Judiciary,
113th
Cong.
(2014),
available
at
http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/f05f9055-75b3-4a01-b2e7-9d770c5b9223/060214-first-saletestimony-smith.pdf.
40 Id. at 895.
41 Id. at 896. This concept is limited to physical goods because when purchasers “modify”
musical works digitally, sometimes as “samples,” they may infringe the original work by creating a
35
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Doctrine also promotes innovation in technology for secondary markets, like CD swap
services, Netflix, and Redbox.42 Those who argue to extend the First Sale Doctrine to
digital works do so based on the idea that copyrighted works should be shared to
promote access, preservation, market efficiency, and innovation, regardless of their
form.43
Congress and courts worry about extending the First Sale Doctrine to digital
works because it was created for tangible works, and without thought to digital
works.44 First, transactions for digital works are typically licenses for use, not actual
“sales.”45 Even when transactions for digital works do give ownership rights, the
implications of the sale are not equal for physical works, which have a limited
lifetime, and digital works, have an almost-infinite lifetime.46 Lastly, modern
technology frequently backs up and creates copies of content, in temporary and
permanent folders. For this reason, even when a party deletes or removes copies of a
work, copies may remain on their devices. Unlike physical works, where copies are
difficult to make and original copies wear out over time, digital copies remain in their
original condition much longer, and there is a “feared cannibalization of sales by
secondary markets.”47 Although the First Sale Doctrine is designed to promote

derivative work without sufficient license. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792
(6th Cir. 2005).
42 Id. at 897.
43 See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889 (2011).
44 U.S. Copyright Office, Library of Cong., Digital Millennium Copyright Act Section 104 Report
48
(2001)
[hereinafter
DMCA],
available
at
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/dmca_study.html. See also Capitol Records, LLC v.
ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding ReDigi liable for infringement
because there no digital First Sale exists: “the court cannot . . . condone the wholesale application of
the first sale defense to the digital sphere, particularly when Congress has declined to take that
step.”).
45 See supra note 4 for an example of iTunes, which creates a limited license in its EULA.
46 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding ReDigi
liable for copyright infringement because it “facilitates and profits from the sale of copyrighted
commercial recordings . . . detrimental to the primary market.” See also Reply Memorandum in
Further Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at *3, Capitol Records, LLC v.
ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (Capitol Records arguing that “ReDigi’s delivery of
pristine digital records at ‘used’ prices supplants the market for legitimate digital distribution”). See
also John Villasenor, Rethinking a Digital First Sale Doctrine in a Post-Kirtsaeng World: The Case
for Caution, COMPETITION POLICY INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST CHRONICLE (May 28, 2013),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2273022 (adding that expanding the first sale doctrine would “open up a
Pandora’s box of unintended consequences” because it would “dramatically reduce the ability of
content creators to be properly compensated for works sold digitally” because works could be
replicated and distributed without being traced).
47 Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889 (2011)
(discussing how some fear a digital First Sale doctrine would cause a “cannibalization” or
destruction of sales for the original work because the secondary market could vigorously compete
with the original market by providing copies of the work with the same quality of the original).
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innovation, it was not created with an eye towards digital technology, and to-date has
not been extended to protect non-physical works.48
C. Copyright Balancing Innovation and Infringement
Congress and the courts balance policies for deterring infringement to protect
owners’ rights with those promoting innovation to ensure public benefit. The
Supreme Court has ruled on technologies that may infringe copyrights. In the
landmark case Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, the Court held that
consumers did not infringe copyrights when they used videotape recorders to record
television shows for later viewing because the recording was a “fair” use.49 In
addition, the manufacturer of the recorders could not be liable for distributing the
recorders that “fairly used” copyrighted works. 50 The manufacturer created a
technology that, at the time, bordered on copyright infringement, but benefitted by
the Court’s decision that there was no infringement.
Then, in 2005, the Court contemplated a similar question when distributors sold
software that allowed customers to share legitimate files and documents. The
possible legitimate uses did not overcome the issue that the software’s primary use
was illegitimate sharing of copyrighted works. 51 The Court found distributors liable
for secondary infringement because they were keenly aware of the infringement,
made no attempts to diminish or filter out infringing uses of the software, and
continued to profit from the software.52
The Court added “when an article is good for nothing else but infringement,
there is no legitimate public interest in its unlicensed availability.”53 There is
liability when distributors engage in “purposeful, culpable expression and conduct,”
but the Court cautioned that “the more artistic protection is favored, the more

See id. for an explanation on rights that are impacted by First Sale. See also Ginn & Co. v.
Apollo Publishing, 215 F. 772 (E.D. Pa. 1914) (stating that a copy owner cannot create a derivate
work, but “an alteration that includes (or consumes) a complete copy of the original lacks economic
significance” does not necessarily constitute a derivative work; therefore, distributing the altered
work is not a violation of a holder’s exclusive rights, and is covered by the First Sale Doctrine).
49 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
50 Id. at 475-476. Recorders were mainly used for time-shifting purposes, which were merely
personal uses. The balancing test is implemented to support the copyright’s policy to “advance
public welfare.” See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992) (factors of fair use doctrine include “purpose and
character of the use” of the work, the “nature of the copyrighted work,” the “amount and
substantiality of the portion used,” and the “effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.”).
51 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
52 Id. at 934 (stating “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.” The Court adds that
“mere knowledge” of the infringement is not enough to create liability, nor would be “ordinary acts
incident to product distribution” like “technical support or product updates.”)
53 Id. at 932.
48
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technological innovation may be discouraged,” and “copyright law is an exercise in
managing the tradeoff.”54
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), passed in 1998, imposes
liability for technology that is designed to “circumvent” measures that control access
to a copyrighted work.55 This, in effect, prohibits individuals from using new
technologies to bypass copyright controls, like “digital rights management (DRM)
technology or a software copy protection system.” 56 The act of providing the
technological tools for circumventing copyrights is illegal. 57 With the passage of the
DMCA, Congress acknowledged that the “extension of the first sale doctrine” to
intangible property is “antithetical to the policies the doctrine was intended to
further.”58
While some argue that the DMCA “in practice… ha[s] been used to stifle a wide
array of legitimate activities,” DMCA language has not evolved to encompass future
technologies that infringe copyrights in unforeseen ways. 59 Courts look to copyright
law to interpret whether the infringement-causing technology is actually a fair use,
or if there is no infringement because of the First Sale Doctrine. Technology that
causes copyright infringement continues to develop, but copyright law has not
changed in almost 20 years. Patent law may provide an alternative outlet for
managing particular technology.
D. Patent Law Policy and Framework
Congress’ authority for patent law also arises from the Constitution. 60 The law
protects inventions that are “subject matter eligible” as a “process, machine,

Id. at 937-966 (stating that “the inducement rule . . . premises liability on purposeful,
culpable expression . . . and thus, does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage
innovation having a lawful purpose.” There is a “sound balance” between supporting copyright
protection and promoting innovation new communication technologies that may be upset by
“limiting the incidence of liability for copyright infringement.”) See generally Jane C. Ginsburg,
Copyright and Control Over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (2001).
See also H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1909) (stating “In enacting a copyright law,
Congress must consider . . . two questions: First, how much will the legislation stimulate the
producer and so benefit the public; and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental
to the public?”).
55 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998); see also Greg
Sandoval, RealNetworks loses critical ruling in RealDVD case, CNET (August 11, 2009 5:54 PM),
http://www.cnet.com/news/realnetworks-loses-critical-ruling-in-realdvd-case/.
56
Circumventing Copyright Controls, Digital Media Law Project (May 9, 2008),
http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/circumventing-copyright-controls.
57 Id.
58 144. Cong. Rec. H. 7074 (1998) (statement of Chairman Coble).
59 Unintended Consequences: Twelve Years under the DMCA, Electronic Frontier Foundation
(March 3, 2010), https://www.eff.org/wp/unintended-consequences-under-dmca.
60 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the progress of science and the useful arts”).
54
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manufacture, or composition of matter.” 61 The invention must also be “useful,” 62
novel,63 non-obvious,64 and fully and particularly described.65 The Supreme Court
clarified that no patents are available to “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas.”66 Patent law provides creators the right to “exclude” others from
practicing their technology for a limited period of time. 67
The Court provided a two-part framework for analyzing patent eligibility: first,
whether claims are subject matter eligible; and second, whether the inventive
concept goes beyond “the [ineligible concept] itself.” 68 Computer-implemented
inventions are particularly analyzed for “abstractness.” 69 The Court held a process
for curing synthetic rubber to be patent eligible when it used a computer to apply an
equation for calculating time to cure the rubber.70 Alternatively, the Court held a
claim that described the “basic concept” of hedging to be an un-patentable abstract
idea even though the invention was in a “particular technological environment.” 71
Similarly, the Court deemed a method ineligible when it explained “intermediated
settlements,” claimed a “preexisting human activity,” and computer-implementation

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
Id.
63 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
64 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
65 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
66 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
67 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (“Whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention infringes the patent.”) See also 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012) (“Such grant shall be for a
term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which
the application was filed in the United States . . . .”).
68 Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
69 Preliminary Memorandum, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Preliminary
Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v.
CLS
Bank
International,
et
al.,
(Jun.
25,
2014),
at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/announce/alice_pec_25jun2014.pdf (discussing that patents that were
eligible upon filing may not still be considered eligible as non-abstract). See also Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank, 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (2014) (“Abstract” remains undefined by the Court because “[we] need not
labor to delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category.” “Abstract intellectual concepts”
are “basic tools of scientific and technological work,” and patent protection “might tend to impede
innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”) See also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964)
(stating that the Court will “know a [patent eligible claim] when [it] see[s] it”).
70 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (holding that the process applying an equation using a
computer was patent-eligible because the invention achieved “something the industry had not been
able to obtain.”). See also Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (2014) (clarifying that the
invention in Diehr was patent eligible because it “improved an existing technological process” and
“not because [it was] implemented on a computer”).
71 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609 (2010) (discussing that an invention cannot merely be an
abstract idea that is limited to a “particular technological environment” to be patentable and
“allowing petitioners to patent risk hedging would preempt use of this approach in all fields, and
would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.”).
61
62
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of the method was not “enough” to make the system eligible. 72 The Federal Circuit
added that “when a computer receives and sends information over a network . . . [is]
not even arguably inventive” and merely carrying out an abstract idea is not enough
to warrant patent eligibility.73
Since Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, software and business method patents have been
invalidated with greater frequency.74 Technologies that are seen as “abstract” are
not patent-eligible, and the question of “abstractness” is now contemplated for almost
all software technologies.75 The Federal Circuit invalidated a patent, which claimed
methods for online financial transactions between two entities because, in theory, the
transaction could be carried out without computers. 76 More recently, the Federal
Circuit invalidated a patent for a method of Internet-distribution of copyrighted
products for abstractness.77

Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. 2354, 2356 (2014) (establishing that what is claimed must
amount to “more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea of intermediated settlement using
some unspecified, generic computer.”).
73 buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
74 Imran Khaliq, Post-Alice Corp. Decisions Show Increased Trend of Courts Invalidating
Computerized
Business
Method
Patents,
MONDAQ
(Sept.
8,
2014),
at
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/340020/Patent/PostAlice+Corp+Decisions+Show+Increased+
Trend+Of+Courts+Invalidating+Computerized+Business+Method+Patents.
75 35 U.S.C. 101 (2012).
76 buySAFE, Inc., 765 F.3d at 1351(holding a patent claiming “methods and machine-readable
media encoded to perform steps for guaranteeing a party’s performance of its online transaction”
ineligible for protection as abstract when it “describe[d] a well-known, and widely-understood
concept – a third party guarantee of a sales transaction – and then applied that concept using
conventional computer technology and the Internet.” The court held that computer functionality was
merely generic because the “claims do not require specific programming” and are not “tied to any
particular machine.” See also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)(discussing that
abstractness is an issue for claims “involving contractual relations” between “intangible entities”
because the contractual relations often relate to “fundamental economic practice long prevalent in
our system of commerce.”).
77 Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013), vacated 134 S. Ct. 2870
(2014), remanded to 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (revealing messiness of abstractness standard, the
Federal Circuit stripped a patent of eligibility after finding that it was “directed to the abstract idea
of offering free media in exchange for watching advertisements” and the “mere implementation” of
the idea on a computer doesn’t change that fact. The court added that the claims didn’t include
meaningful limitations that would convert the abstract idea, because “adding routine additional
steps such as updating an activity log, requiring a request from the consumer to view the ad,
restrictions on public access, and use of the Internet does not transform an otherwise abstract idea
into patent-eligible subject matter.”). See also Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 2014 U.S. App.
LEXIS 16412 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (invalidating a patent for the computer-aided management of bingo
games in which court finds that claims for managing a bingo a game “consis[t] solely of mental steps
which can be carried out by a human using pen and paper.” The court rejected the argument the
game required computer assistance due to thousands or millions of numbers to manage such that
manual management would be impossible, because that capability of the invention was not captured
72
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If a claim is merely an abstract idea, then it only becomes patent eligible if it
The Mayo framework arose from Mayo
survives the Mayo framework.78
Collaborative Service v. Prometheus Laboratories, and holds that a patent must go
beyond claiming “well understood, routine, and conventional activity.” 79 Use of a
generic computer to carry out steps of a patent ineligible concept does not create
eligibility.80 Unlike Diehr, in which the Court granted a patent for a process that
applied an equation using a computer, the Court in Alice said the computer failed to
Courts also consider whether
improve an existing technological process.81
“allowing . . . to patent . . . would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract
idea.”82 To survive an eligibility analysis, software and computerized business
method claims must be narrowly drafted, instead of broadly claiming generic ideas. 83
Patent law continues to develop in order to deal with ever-changing technology,
including software. Although the effects of Alice leave practitioners wondering
whether inventions are merely “abstract,” the developing case law follows modern
statutory law.
E. Patent Law’s Consideration of Moral Utility
At common law, the “moral utility” doctrine allowed courts and the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) to deny patent protection to

in the claims. The court added that the claims sought to organize “human activity,” making them
similar to and ineligible on the same grounds as Bilski and Alice.).
78 See Preliminary Memorandum, Patent and Trademark Office, Preliminary Examination
Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank
International,
et
al.,
(Jun.
25,
2014),
at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/announce/alice_pec_25jun2014.pdf (“further guidance will be issued
after additional consideration of the decision and public feedback in the context of the existing law
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”) Compare Gene Quinn, Examiners Begin Issuing Alice Rejections for
Software,
IPWATCHDOG
(July
14,
2014,
10:00
am),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/07/14/examiners-begin-issuing-alice-rejections-forsoftware/id=50412/ (discussing that examiners appear to be issuing form language in rejections for
computer-implemented inventions for a large number of applications).
79 Mayo Collaborative Service v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct 1289 (2012).
80 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. 2354 (2014).
81 Id.
82 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611-12 (2010) (“[a]llowing petitioners to patent risk hedging
would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an
abstract idea.”). See also Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. 2354 (2014) (explaining that the
“machine-or-transformation test” had been a “useful and important clue” for determining patent
eligibility; however, it is not the “sole test” because it imposes limitations on the definition of
“process” that Congress did not create).
83 Michael S. Borella & Kevin E. Noonan, Supreme Court Issues Decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank,
SNIPPETS
(2014),
http://www.mbhb.com/pubs/xpqPublicationDetail.aspx?xpST=PubDetail&pub=283.
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controversial matters.84 The USPTO claimed that immoral inventions were not
“useful” to the public, and therefore were ineligible for protection. 85 Now, the
USPTO only contemplates “moral utility” of biotechnological patents. 86 Courts have
hesitated to make “useful” mean “moral” without Congress’s blessing. 87 Congress
has implemented special restrictions for inventions in biotechnology 88 and national
security.89 Given the power to draw restrictions for certain inventions, Congress has

See Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (holding that inventions that are
"injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society" are unpatentable). See also
Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1880) (holding that “Congress never intended that the
patent laws should displace the police powers of the States . . . those powers by which the health,
good order, peace and general welfare of the community are promoted.”).
85 See Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (holding that inventions that are
"injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society" are unpatentable). See also
Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1880) (holding that “Congress never intended that the
patent laws should displace the police powers of the States . . . those powers by which the health,
good order, peace and general welfare of the community are promoted.”).
86 See Media Advisory, Patent and Trademark Office, Facts on Patenting Life Forms Having a
Relationship to Humans (Apr. 1, 1998), at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/98-06.htm
(discussing limitations on patenting particular biotechnological innovations, including life forms
related to humans, stating that "it is the position of the PTO that human/non-human chimera
could . . . not be patentable because, among other things, they would fail to meet the public policy
and morality aspects of the utility requirement" which suggests the existence of the common law
moral utility doctrine. The USPTO adds that “[t]he courts have interpreted the utility requirement
to exclude inventions deemed to be ‘injurious to the well being, good policy, or good morals of
society’”). However, see Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, 9th ed. (March 2014), §706.03(a)
(stating that a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for lack of utility should not be based on grounds that
the invention is frivolous, fraudulent or against public policy).
87 Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that “[o]f
course, Congress is free to declare particular types of inventions unpatentable for a variety of
reasons, including deceptiveness. Until such time as Congress does so, however, we find no basis in
section 101 to hold that inventions can be ruled unpatentable for lack of utility simply because they
have the capacity to fool some members of the public.”). See also Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask
Questions Later: Morality And Biotechnology In Patent Law, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 469 (2003),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol45/iss2/3 (discussing how denial of patent protection is not a
complete loss to an invention because the invention may still be practiced. Absence of a patent
results in the inventor being denied monopoly and exclusive rights, and that the patent will not be
published, which may permit the technology to be treated as trade secret.).
88 See supra note 86. See generally Sander Rabin, The human use of humanoid beings: chimeras
and
patent
law,
Nature
Biotechnology
(2006),
available
at
http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v24/n5/full/nbt0506-517.html
(discussing
generally
the
limitations on the USPTO’s ruling that patents may not issue on human organisms, but left open
questions about non-human subject matter).
89 35 U.S.C. § 181 (2012) (authorizing the Commissioner of Patents to order that an invention be
kept secret and to withhold the publication of an application or grant of a patent on the invention).
84
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the power to discriminate against immoral inventions because they do not provide
the public with legitimate benefits and utility.90
III. ANALYSIS
To date, Congress has relied on copyright law to deal with incentivizing creation
when new technology is developed to infringe copyrights. 91 The business model for
ReDigi, a digital secondary marketplace, is inconsistent with copyright policy because
it infringes on copyrighted works, and fails to comply with patent policy because it
lacks legitimate utility. Technology departs from legitimate constitutional purposes
by: (1) causing or inducing copyright infringement; (2) being capable of substantial
non-infringing uses; and (3) being subject matter eligible for patent protection in a
post-Alice world. When technology is designed to, or substantially used for,
infringing copyrights, should patent law make the technology patent-ineligible, such
that the inventor can’t gain exclusive rights? Applying this analysis to ReDigi raises
questions of whether ReDigi was created for infringing uses and whether ReDigi’s
patents may be challenged.
A. Does ReDigi Cause Copyright Infringement?
ReDigi facilitates infringement of copyright holders’ exclusive rights to
reproduce and distribute.92 To use ReDigi, a seller designates files, which they may
not actually own,93 from a personal library, and then ReDigi’s software assesses
whether the file was legally obtained. 94 If the file is eligible for resale, then the file is

Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (stating that “the sole interest of the United
States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of the authors.”).
91 See supra note 54 discussing how copyright law has been used to manage the tradeoff
between artistic protection and technological innovation. See also American Library Association, et
al., Balanced Copyright Preserves the Right to Innovate, LIBRARY COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE, available at
http://www.librarycopyrightalliance.org/bm~doc/balanced_copyright_innovation.pdf (arguing that
“while copyright promotes creativity, many of the specific measures adopted or recently proposed to
protect copyright in the digital age actually impede innovative technologies and services.”).
92 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). See supra note 31. See generally Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc.,
934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
93 See supra note 4 for a discussion of ownership versus access.
94 U.S. Patent No. 8,627,500 (issued on Jan. 7, 2014) (claiming a verification aspect that
assesses whether the user identity matches the provided account information, that the file matches
the provided description. To evaluate whether a song was “legally owned” and “lawfully purchased,”
the patent is ambiguous and states that evaluating “owned” is a “policy decision.” The claims include
evaluating whether content is “legally owned,” because digital media objects (DMOs) are evaluated
at a flexible standard. The patent says, “a liberal policy is to assume every DMO was legally
acquired. A highly restrictive policy assumes that only DMO’s with DRM . . . are legally owned,” but
there is no resolution about which policy is adopted to be “non-infringing” in the minds of ReDigi.)
90

[15:91 2015]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

106

migrated by “atomic transfer.”95 ReDigi argues that this technology prevents a file
from being reproduced because it “migrates” the file “packet by packet,” and a
desktop client sweeps the seller’s computer for duplicates. 96 ReDigi claims that the
technology does not violate a copyright holder’s exclusive right to reproduce.97
ReDigi argues that copies made during upload constitute “fair use,” an affirmative
defense to infringement.98 ReDigi’s argument that it does not “reproduce” relies on
the functionality of the “sweeping” software, and on seller’s good faith in deleting
copies from every file, CD, and device.
ReDigi’s technology interferes with a holder’s right to distribute because it
enables an individual to alienate digital works, which are not in the scope of the First
Sale Doctrine. The current interpretation of the First Sale Doctrine does not cover
digital MP3s, therefore ReDigi’s enabling the resale of purchased digital work is an
unlawful distribution of original works. 99 For this reason, when sellers use ReDigi,
they are infringers of copyrighted works.
The creators of the software are
secondarily liable for facilitating and advocating for the infringement, for having

ReDigi’s patent covers two types of claims: apparatus and method. “Apparatus claims cover what a
device is, not what device does.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis by the court), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1076 (1990). Method claims consist of
steps or acts that must be carried out or performed, instead of any tangible things. Paragon
Solutions, LLC v. Timex Corp., 566 F.3d 1075, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
95 Id.
96 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). See also U.S.
Patent No. 8,627,500 (issued on Jan. 7, 2014) (stating that “[t]he goal is to delete, expunge, remove,
or disable all of the copies of this digital media object . . . so that there is only a single copy of the
DMO whose ownership will be transferred during the sale . . . it may be impossible to delete the copy
of a digital media object.”). The claims provides that the software will “remember” the sale so that
any connected devices will be wiped, that the software will use a fingerprint of the DMO so if the
seller attempts to upload the file a second time, the copy will be recognized, and that whenever
portable devices are connected, “the manager will attempt to remove copies as well.” The language
suggests that ReDigi’s “sweeping” method is not fail-proof, and may intrude on the reproduction
right under 17 U.S.C. § 106.
97 See Answer at 9,Capitol Records v. ReDigi, No.12-cv-0095 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.19, 2012)(“No copy of
the file in the ReDigi Cloud is made when the Eligible File is sold by one ReDigi user to another
ReDigi user.”), but see supra note 96.
98 See supra note 50. See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 653
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The Court has little difficulty concluding that ReDigi’s reproduction and
distribution of Capitol’s copyrighted works falls well outside the fair use defense.” ReDigi’s
argument that uploading to and downloading from the ReDigi server “for storage and personal use”
fails because these uses “fall outside the ambit of fair use.”). See generally Arista Records, LLC v.
Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2010) (court held no fair use available when a user uploads and
downloads on P2P file-sharing network when the network was found to be infringing).
99 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The court
rejected the argument that First Sale applies to digital works and stated “the court
cannot . . . condone the wholesale application of the first sale defense to the digital sphere,
particularly when Congress has declined to take that step.”
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specific knowledge of the infringement without attempting to filter 100 out infringing
uses from non-infringing uses, and for directly benefitting from the infringing uses.
Although ReDigi continues to argue for a digital First Sale Doctrine, the current void
in copyright law makes ReDigi’s use a violation of current copyright law.
B. Is ReDigi Capable of Non-Infringing Uses?
The second inquiry is established by precedent cases on new technology capable
of infringing copyrights, and asks whether ReDigi is capable of substantial noninfringing uses.101 The DMCA imposes liability for copyright infringement on
creators and distributors of technology designed to “circumvent” copyright protection
measures.102 For infringing technologies, the primary considerations are: (a)
whether the technology is protected as a “fair use”, (b) whether the primary purpose
of the technology is to infringe copyrights, and (c) whether the technology is capable
of substantial non-infringing uses. ReDigi’s particular design, and even its promoted
purpose, is for the re-sale of digital content.103 No infringement occurs when a seller
re-sells music that is no longer protected under copyright, but ReDigi does not
purport to have any filters or methods for separating “public domain” content from
protected content.104 Even if any individual uses of ReDigi were “fair”, the majority
of the remaining uses call for the distribution of purchased digital content for a
commercial profit, which is the kind of behavior that copyright law seeks to
prevent.105
If ReDigi were to restrict its function to only non-infringing uses, like works
with naked licenses or in the public domain, the consumer market would be minimal
because non-infringing uses would be for works that don’t receive copyright

See supra note 52.
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); MGM Studios Inc.
v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
102 U.S. Copyright Office, Library of Cong., Digital Millennium Copyright Act Section 104
Report 48 (2001), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/dmca_study.html. See
supra note 44 for background on DMCA.
103 The New ReDigi, http://www.redigi.com//site/index-invite.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2014).
104 See MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 918 (2005) (holding summary
judgment was in error when there was substantial evidence of intent to infringe, including that
distributor failed to “develop filtering tools or other mechanisms to diminish the infringing activity
using the software.”).
105 See supra notes 50 and 98. ReDigi’s taking of copyrighted works fail to “advance public
welfare” to tip the 17 U.S.C § 107 balancing test in favor of a fair use because (1) the purpose and
character use is non-transformative and for commercial profit, (2) the copyrighted works are entitled
to a high level of protection as original works of music, (3) ReDigi takes the entire work, thereby
taking too much in quantity and quality; and (4) ReDigi’s uses of the original work cause harm to
the original because ReDigi creates competition for the original, which would reduces profit for the
holder. This is particularly true because digital works do not decay over time the way that physical
works do, thereby making First Sale a poor argument for this element of fair use.
100
101
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protection.106 iTunes has already taken strides to deflate prices, making ReDigi’s
discounted prices less attractive.107
While ReDigi’s intention aligns with the constitutional design of “promot[ing]
the progress of . . . useful arts” by providing access to music at reduced costs, it
interferes with constructive monopolies created by copyright law. It is unrealistic to
expect that ReDigi might limit its function to non-infringing uses, like for public
domain works. In ABC v. Aereo, the Court held a technology service company liable
for copyright infringement when it provided users with a technology that allowed
them to watch television shows without the authority of the copyright holder. 108
Aereo has several patents on television antennae systems; one antenna, the subject
of the lawsuit, was designed specifically to circumvent copyright laws. 109 The
defense of fair use that arose in Sony Corp. was not addressed in the Court’s holding
in Aereo.110 The Court will not hurry to resolve questions that Congress hasn’t given
clear direction on.111
C. Is ReDigi’s Patent Subject-Matter Eligible?
Technology that is narrowly designed to infringe copyrights has minimal
legitimate public benefit, and the government should not invest “time, services, and
use of funds” in protecting such technology.112 The third question, whether ReDigi’s
“atomic transfer” patent qualifies for patent protection under the current
interpretation of eligibility standards, is a threshold question under current patent
laws.113

See supra note 30 about the bounds of copyright protection.
See supra note 17.
108 ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
109 Pete Putman, Deconstructing Aereo’s Patent, TVTECHNOLOGY (Apr. 23, 2013 3:27PM),
http://www.tvtechnology.com/news/0086/deconstructing-aereos-patent/270097.
See
generally
AEREO,
INC.
Patent
applications,
PATENTDOCS
(March
2014),
http://www.faqs.org/patents/assignee/aereo-inc/.
110 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.,
134 S.Ct. 2498 (2014), No. 13-461 (“questions involving cloud computing . . . and other novel issues
not before the Court, as to which ‘Congress has not plainly marked [the] course,’ should await a case
in which they are squarely presented.”) (quoting Sony Corp., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984)).
111 See, e.g., Omega, S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2008), aff'd, 131
S. Ct. 565 (2010) (relying on the “First Sale” Doctrine without contemplating fair use).
112 In re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (considering a mark for the
word “tail” and considered word may have a nonvulgar meaning of “rear end” or a vulgar meaning of
a “female sexual partner,” court held that mark could not be registered - not because Congress seeks
to regulate morality, but because “such marks [should] not occupy the time, services, and use of
funds of the federal government.”). See also In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 486, 673 (1981) (defining
scandalous marks, which are not-protectable, as “shocking to the sense of propriety, offensive to the
conscience or moral feelings or call out for condemnation.”).
113 U.S. Patent No. 8,627,500 (issued on Jan. 7, 2014) (claiming “atomic transfer . . . .”) See
generally Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. at 2354,
106
107
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ReDigi was issued a patent, U.S. 8,627,500, on January 7, 2014, which claims a
“method and apparatus for sharing, transferring, and removing previously owned
digital media.”114 The patent claims a process for managing digital content using
“digital data processors (e.g. personal (or private) computers, laptops, dedicated
music devices…) that are in communications with one or more stores.115 While not a
law of nature or physical phenomena, the patent walks the “abstract” line because
the inventive concept is merely for transferring content from one user’s device to
another. The concept of a digital transfer parallels physical transfers at garage sales:
a physical transfer of goods, where a seller can discard of, and a buyer can obtain, a
used good. ReDigi takes electronic sales of digital goods, and links them to a
technological environment. The Federal Circuit’s newest decision in Ultramercial
suggests that a court would find ReDigi’s inventive concept to be abstract and merely
computer-implemented, therefore ineligible for protection. ReDigi’s concept would be
ineligible because the "transfer of content between computers is merely what
computers do”116 and ReDigi failed to claim any specific hardware components. 117
D. Does ReDigi Survive the Complete Patent Framework?
In addition to being subject-matter eligible, an invention must also be novel,118
The “useful” question is
non-obvious,119 fully described,120 and useful.121
particularly relevant for ReDigi because the usefulness of an invention may be

2356 (2014) (requiring more than an abstract idea merely implemented by a generic computer, and
abstract is a component of subject matter eligibility).
114 U.S. Patent No. 8,627,500 (issued Jan. 7, 2014).
115 Id. at page 1, column 2.
116 Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014). See also Alice, 134 S. Ct. at
2355 (holding that none of the hardware recited by the system claims “offer a meaningful limitation
beyond generally linking ‘the use of the [method] to a particular technological environment,’ that is,
implementation via computers.” The court adds that the claims “recite the abstract idea
implemented on a generic computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic computer
components configured to implement the same idea.” The Court also adds that 101 should not be
interpreted “in ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the draftsman’s art.’”).
117 Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Compare buySAFE, Inc. v.
Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (rejecting a patent on a claim that uses a computer to
complete a financial transaction that could be carried out entirely by hand). Contra U.S. Patent No.
8,627,500 (issued on Jan. 7, 2014) (calling for an almost-entirely electronic transaction). See also
note 114 for information on the method and apparatus claim distinction in patent law.
118 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
119 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). See generally Tim Worstall, Is the Patent System Broken? Well,
Amazon’s Just Patented The Sale of Second Hand Goods, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2013 10:33AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/02/06/is-the-patent-system-broken-well-amazons-justpatented-the-sale-of-second-hand-goods/ (discussing how Amazon’s “secondary market for digital
objects” is not obvious because the concepts are based on exchanges for “real world, for real goods.”).
120 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
121 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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diminished for technologies against public policy. Patent law encourages innovation
by granting “constructive monopol[ies]” to inventors.122
Historically, courts considered inventions to be unpatentable if they were
against public policy.123 The USPTO pointed out the ineligibility of certain
biotechnologies for failing to meet “public policy and morality aspects of the utility
requirement,” which is believed to suggest a resurrection of the “moral utility
doctrine” that was thought to be abandoned. 124 Inventions that facilitate violations
of the laws have been patent-protected, but ReDigi presents an invention that is
designed solely for violating the law, and only has limited legal uses. 125
ReDigi’s public benefits, like increasing access to works at reduced cost and
decreasing “alienation” of works, must be weighed against the injury to copyright
holders. ReDigi could “filter” out illegitimate uses by restricting utility to works that
are in the public domain or nakedly licensed, but it is highly unlikely that ReDigi
would make such a move and still retain its marketability. 126
Despite being keenly aware of ReDigi’s copyright-infringing uses, the USPTO
granted ReDigi’s patent. This granting gave ReDigi the ability to access and gain
more customers, which further injures copyright holders’ rights. ReDigi has not
volunteered any ways in which the technology is solely “useful” and beneficial to the
public. The passage of the DMCA suggests that Congress seeks to reduce “copyright
infringement” as it is against public policy. Copyright laws are outdated, and have
been outpaced by technology, but the idea of infringement being immoral continues.
The “moral utility” doctrine of patent law is relatively dormant, but it may be an
avenue for controlling the detriments of ReDigi and similar technologies. 127
Resurrecting the doctrine would require care because technologies like ReDigi may
have non-infringing uses that promote free expression and information sharing. 128
122 Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is still Property, 13 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol'y 108, 108 (1990) (arguing that the patent system’s exclusive rights are not for preventing
competition or monopolizing a market, but instead recognizes efforts made in creating technology,
and balances “dynamic gains” with “allocative losses” to allow an inventor a limited time over which
he can demand a price for his intellectual property).
123 See supra notes 85—90 and surrounding text for a discussion of morality in patent eligibility.
124 Cynthia M. Ho, Spliciing Morality and Patent Law: Issues Arising from Mixing Mice and
Men, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 247, 253 (2000), available at
http://www.public.iastate.edu/~jwcwolf/Papers/HoPaper.pdf.
125 Whistler Corp. v. Autotronics, Inc., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17302, 14 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA)
1885, 1886 (W.D. Tex. 1988) (finding utility in a radar signal detector, even though the device aids
those who violate the law). See also ROCKY MOUNTAIN RADAR, https://rockymountainradar.com/thebest-radar-detector/ (radar detectors and scramblers specifically designed to prevent consumers
from being detected by police officers).
126 See What is Freegal, FREEGAL (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.freegalmusic.com/questions, for a
discussion of a service underwritten by libraries that offers free downloads of music and movies by
the Sony Entertainment Group.
127 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Article: Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575
(2003) (“The courts have all but abandoned the requirement that an invention be morally
beneficial, permitting patents even on inventions that seem calculated to deceive.”).
128 See supra notes 44 and 55 and surrounding text for a discussion of DMCA. Congress passed
the DMCA as a method of improving the balance between innovation and creativity by imposing
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There’s an argument to be made that there is no authority either allowing or
implementing limitations in patent law for inventions designed to violate copyright
law.129 This bridge has been crossed before with the principle of “functionality” used
as a means for dividing works into copyright and patent channels. 130 Congress can
create and amend laws that improve both patent and copyright protection.131
Congress is entitled to provide power, accordingly, to the USPTO.132
If Congress withholds patent protection from copyright-infringing technologies,
it would stop legitimizing technologies that are harmful to the public. Without
patent protection, an inventor can practice his invention, but without the key
innovation incentives of exclusion or monopoly.133 The inventor, in practicing his
invention, could become liable for inducing copyright-infringement. ReDigi’s patent
provides the façade that it is beneficial to the public and the progress of science and
the useful arts — a false legitimacy that could be resolved by denying patent
protection. Alternatively, providing ReDigi with a monopoly would give it the
exclusive opportunity to practice its technology, which would eliminate competition.
Fewer infringement-inducing technologies could reduce the potential for copyright
infringement. ReDigi’s patent would reduce competition with Apple and Amazon
because of a reduced incentive to create digital secondary markets, especially without
protection of a digital First Sale Doctrine.134
liability for technology that is designed to “circumvent” measures that control access to a
copyrighted work. The DMCA protects copyrighted works while attempting to limit the incentive for
creating technology that infringes copyrights.
129
Musicians
and
Artists
Profile,
USPTO
(Sept.
2,
2011
11:13AM),
http://www.uspto.gov/faq/musicart.jsp (discussing that Congress created the Library of Congress’
Copyright office for dealing with copyrights). USPTO interference with the Copyright Office may
lead to confusion, disorganization, and misapplication of copyright laws that the USPTO may be
unfamiliar with. Dina LaPolt, Opinion: Copyrights Different Than Patents, Trademarks, The Hill
(Dec. 10, 2014 7:49PM) (stating that “the Copyright Office’s ongoing review of copyright laws is
being compromised by involved from the USPTO” because the “USPTO has no particular expertise
in copyright law” and “there is no ‘C’ in PTO”).
130 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) (identifying that any design “utilitarian function” will trigger a
separability test for determining whether the invention is better covered by patent or copyright); see
also Dennis S. Karjala, The Relative Roles of Patent and Copyright in the Protection of Computer
Programs, 17 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 41 (1998) (“little subject matter overlap” between
copyright and patent subject matter “copyright has always eschewed protection of functional
works . . . patent law has tried to steer clear of works that are merely useful in the sense of
informing human beings or portraying an appearance but not functional in the sense of actually
doing work in the physical world.”).
131 Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Anatomy
of a Congressional Power, 43 IDEA 1 (2002).
132 General Information Concerning Patents, United States Patent and Trademark Office (Oct.
2014), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerningpatents.
133 See supra note 67.
134 See supra notes 4,5-8,and 21 for background on Apple’s control of the music market. See
generally John T. Soma & Michael K. Kugler, Why Rent When You Can Own? How ReDigi, Apple,
and Amazon Will Use the Cloud and the Digital First Sale Doctrine to Resell Music, E-Books, Games,
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Congress has implemented special requirements for categories of technology
before. For example, secrecy must be maintained for patents affecting national
security.135 Secrecy would be a chronically-violated requirement for patent holders
like ReDigi, who seek to reach a large audience of consumers. 136 However, a patent
law requirement geared specifically towards technologies designed to copyrightinfringement may be used to reduce harm to copyright holders.
IV. PROPOSAL
Currently, when a technology’s primary purpose is for infringing copyrights, the
technology may be patent-protected. Once used in an infringing manner, the
technology distributor may be liable for copyright infringement. The current model,
based on judicial direction and the DMCA, permits patent-protection for inventions
that have minimal legitimate use. In Sony, the Court assessed distributors’
infringement liability when they distributed video tape recorders allowing consumers
to record television shows.137 Similarly, in Aereo, a service company was held liable
for infringement when it allowed consumers to watch television shows at any time
and without authority.138 Thus far, the courts have relied only on copyright law to
protect copyright holders’ rights.
A. Current Focus on Copyright: Previous and Pending Legislative Actions
Congress recently contemplated extending the application of the First Sale
Doctrine to digital content.139 Copyright policy weighs against creating a digital
First Sale Doctrine because copyright holders’ rights would be over-exhausted and
sale prices for digital content are not set to incorporate secondary sales possibilities,
so holders would be burdened with reduced royalties.140
and Movies, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH 425, 449 (2014). Apple’s pending patent for a digital secondary
marketplace would give Apple an extreme advantage in market competition, as it already employs a
limiting EULA. Apple would be in a position to monopolize the market because ReDigi is designed
to comply with iTunes music specifically. Apple could manipulate the digital content market under
the guise of “maintaining authenticity of music.”
135 35 U.S.C. § 181 (2015).
136 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 918 (2005) (holding music company liable
for infringement when it “had shown itself to be aiming to satisfy a known source of demand for
copyright infringement” after the collapse of Napster. “After the notorious file-sharing service,
Napster, was sued by copyright holders for facilitating copyright infringement . . . promoted and
marketed themselves as Napster alternatives.”).
137 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
138 ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
139 See First Sale Under Title 17: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property,
and the Internet of the House Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (2014), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/2014/6/hearing-first-sale-under-title-17.
140 See supra note 39 and surrounding text for an explanation of exhaustion. See generally U.S.
Copyright Office, Library of Cong., Digital Millennium Copyright Act Section 104 Report 48 (2001)
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Congress designed the DMCA to moderate the balance between protection of
copyrighted works and advancing technology and innovation. Technology like
Grokster and the Aereo antenna suggests that innovators are still designing
technologies to circumvent copyright measures.141 The DMCA highlighted the
importance of balancing copyright protection and innovation, but didn’t do enough to
reduce innovation for copyright-infringement purposes.
Copyright holders may protect themselves from infringement-inducing
technology by employing Digital Rights Management (DRM) software, which can
limit the use of digital content after its first sale. DRM could be used to give a song
license a limited lifetime, to limit the number of times a song can be transferred, or
even to prevent the song from being played if the user transfers the file to another.142
Copyright holders may implement restrictive agreements during the original
transfer, so that buyers are limited on the uses of the digital content.143
B. Turning the Focus to Patent Utility
Copyright law has managed the tradeoff between “supporting creativity through
copyright protection” and “promoting technological innovation by limiting
infringement liability,” but patent law may be able to help with the balance. 144 As
previously discussed, inventions must be novel, 145 non-obvious,146 fully described,147
and useful to qualify for patent protection.148 “Laws of nature, physical phenomena,

[hereinafter DMCA], available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/dmca_study.html
(stating that, opponents to digital first sale “pointed out that the impact of the doctrine on copyright
owners was also limited in the off-line world by a number of factors, including geography and the
gradual degradation of books and analog works. The absence of such limitations would have an
adverse effect on the market for digital works . . . . We are concerned that these proposals for a
digital first sale doctrine endeavor to fit the exploitation of works online into a distribution model –
the sale of copies – that was developed within the confines of pre-digital technology.”).
141 See MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 918 (2005). See also ABC, Inc. v.
Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). See, e.g., Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487
(1st Cir. 2011), cert denied, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012) (holding a consumer liable for infringement when
he used file-sharing software to download and distribute music recordings without authorization).
142 See supra note 9. See Jason Fitzpatrick, How to Check Out Library Books on Your Kindle for
Free, HOW-TO GEEK (Apr. 17, 2012) (discussing how libraries allow members to borrow e-books on
devices, like Kindle, where the book will automatically expire or return itself at the expiration date,
and if you return the book with notes or highlighting, the book will be “restored” to new). See also
Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books From Kindle, NEW YORK TIMES (July 17, 2009)
(discussing how e-books are controlled after conducting a transaction to buy the e-book).
143 See supra note 134 about how Apple implements restrictive transfers.
144 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 918 (2005)
145 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
146 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
147 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
148 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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and abstract ideas” do not qualify for protection.149 To promote innovation that is
useful and legitimate, the USPTO should use “utility” to deny patent protection to
inventions that are substantially infringing and do not give rise to fair use. This
separate treatment of inventions would not be unprecedented.150
This extension of the utility doctrine creates two opportunities for evaluating
“legitimate utility” of an invention: (1) at patent examination by a patent examiner;
and (2) by a third party who has suffered or will suffer harm that copyright
protection is intended to prevent. Patent examiners may deny patent protection to
patents that substantially infringe copyrights, and are not protected by fair use. The
examiner would make an assessment based solely on the application, and would treat
the application as prima facie evidence of an intent to infringe. Then, should the
examiner deny the patent, the USPTO would bear the burden of showing that the
patent should be denied.151 Just as with other grounds for rejection, the applicant
would have the opportunity to overcome the rejection with evidence.
The applicant must show that the invention is deserving of patent rights by
showing that it doesn’t substantially infringe on copyrights, and that the invention
only uses copyrighted works as “fair” uses. While patent examiners may not be best
equipped to handle these kinds of arguments, the USPTO may designate a group of
examiners to handle these kinds of inventions, as a new “technology center.” 152
If the USPTO grants the patent, then the application may be challenged by third
parties under one of the available post-grant proceedings.153 A party has standing to

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
See supra notes 123—124. See also Media Advisory, Patent and Trademark Office, Facts on
Patenting Life Forms Having a Relationship to Humans (Apr. 1, 1998), at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/98-06.htm. See also 35 U.S.C. § 181 (2012).
151 See Office Statement, Patent and Trademark Office, Official United States Patent and
Trademark Office Statement on the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s (TTAB) Decision in
Blackhorse v. Pro Football (TTAB Cancellation No. 92046185) (June 19, 2014), at
http://www.upsto.gov/news/DCfootballtrademark.jsp (explaining how USPTO mark cancellation
proceedings occur). See also Perry J. Viscounty, et al., Watch Your Mark – navigating the
prohibitions on immoral, scandalous and disparaging trademarks, WORLD TRADEMARK REVIEW
(December 2014), at www.lw.com/thoughtleadership/watch-your-mark (explaining that the USPTO
has the initial burden of proof for unregistrability, and if met, the burden shifts to the applicant to
present “competent evidence”).
152 United States Patent and Trademark Office, General Information Concerning Patents,
USPTO
(Oct.
2014),
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/general_info_concerning_patents.jsp#heading-6 (“the work
of examining applications for patents is divided among a number of examining technology centers
(TCs), each TC having jurisdiction over certain assigned fields of technology”).
153 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (modifying
available post-grant proceedings to include: inter partes review, post-grant review, and ex parte
reexamination, which allows third parties to challenge any unexpired patents on the basis of novelty
or obviousness; however, the third party does not have an absolute right to participate in the
reexamination). Congress may create an additional proceeding for dealing with technologies that
cause copyright infringement, as ex parte reexamination does not guarantee a third party can stay
involved in a proceeding, but for copyright holders acting as third parties, an absolute right to stay
149
150
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challenge if they can “prove that practice impairs commercial value of [their]
copyright or has created likelihood of future harm.” 154 This challenge towards the
“legitimate utility” of an invention requires the third party to present evidence of the
harm. If the third party has standing and the issue is ripe to bring a suit for
copyright infringement, the third party must have done so prior to challenging the
“legitimate utility” of the invention or the third party must show that it is in the
same shoes as parties who have already sued the inventor for copyright
infringement.
The USPTO could create an “incontestability” status for inventions that are not
challenged for “legitimate utility” and are not the subject of copyright infringement
suits in ten years from the patent’s issuance date. This could be loosely modeled
after the trademark “incontestability of a mark” designation. 155 Much like a mark
that remains unchallenged, a technology created with significant legitimate uses
should be entitled to protection. Technology often morphs over time as consumers
create new (and often illegitimate) ways to use inventions. Therefore, this proposal is
restricted to technology, like ReDigi, which is initially designed to infringe on
copyrights. ReDigi, much like Aereo, advertises and promotes the infringing use,
even after receipt of cease-and-desist orders.156 Other technologies, such as those
created primarily for non-infringing uses, should still be able to access patent
protection. The utility of these alternate scenarios, however, should be contemplated
with future research.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court decided several cases dealing with technology designed to
infringe copyrights and circumvent copyright protection. Copyright holders may
argue against a digital First Sale Doctrine, but if Congress extends the doctrine,
copyright holders may wish to implement more DRM software or restrictive
agreements to protect their works. Congress attempted to resolve issues with
respective technologies with the DMCA; but there are still inventions claiming patent
protection that are designed to infringe, like ReDigi and Aereo.
Congress should contemplate adjusting patent-eligibility standards to require
that an invention is genuinely useful, with substantial non-copyright-infringing uses.
The invention should be denied patent protection if the patent application clearly
indicates intent to infringe, even if the patent satisfies other USPTO requirements.

involved may be desirable. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, 9th ed. (March 2014), §2209
for further discussion of ex parte reexamination.
154 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
155 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2010) (“except on a ground for which application to cancel may be filed at
any time . . . the right of the owner to use such registered mark.. shall be incontestable” when
“registered mark has been in continuous use for give consecutive years subsequent to the date of
such registration . . . still in use . . . no final decision adverse to the owner’s claim of
ownership . . . no proceeding involving said rights pending . . . affidavit is filed” and mark is not
generic.”).
156 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 658-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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Issued patents should be contested for “legitimate utility” if the technology has been
involved with or caused infringement liability.
Technologies designed to infringe copyrights tend to be software-based or
computer-implemented, and are raising red flags at the USPTO for subject matter
The high-level of scrutiny that arose post-Alice means these
eligibility.157
technologies should be challenged as merely abstract ideas, especially inventions like
ReDigi that transforms a physical garage sale into a digital one. 158 In light of Alice,
ReDigi’s patent may be abstract. ReDigi’s patent raises questions of why a monopoly
should be awarded to a technology that is specifically designed to infringe. Copyright
holders may implement barriers so their digital content cannot operate on ReDigi
and similar technologies. While the future of ReDigi is unclear, it continues to allow
consumers to join the marketplace. With the advent of Apple and Amazon into the
digital secondary market, ReDigi may dissolve as a “sacrifice” while Apple and
Amazon and other giants reap from its benefits.

157
158

(2014).

See supra note 78.
See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611-12 (2010); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. 2354

